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Income and the school funding formula: A contrary view   
Ralph Townsend, Ph.D.  
Professor of Economics, University of Maine, Orono  
The Committee to Study Organizational and Tax Issues in Public Schools, which was chaired by 
Dr. Jack Rosser, recommended some sweeping changes in how Maine's primary and secondary 
education should be organized and financed. Despite the best intentions of the Rosser 
Commission, its suggestions for funding reform have overshadowed all other parts of the report. 
And, of the funding changes proposed, the suggestion to include income and a cost index in the 
funding formula has received the greatest attention. Although perhaps a little unfair to the 
members of the Rosser Commission, the general reaction to the Commission's ideas for 
including income seems to be: "They're heading in the right direction, but their method is not 
quite right." That is, there seems to be a general sense that income belongs in the funding 
formula, but that the perfect formula still needs to be found.  
It is my purpose here to disagree with this conventional wisdom. There are a number of very 
good reasons to believe that any attempt to add income to the funding formula will create more 
problems than it solves. There are both practical and conceptual difficulties in measuring 
income. Incorporating income into the funding formula has the unintended effect of lowering 
property taxes for industrial and recreational property in many towns. The real inequities of the 
property tax-primarily the impact upon families on fixed incomes--can be addressed much more 
effectively by the targeted relief of circuit-breakers or homestead tax credits. And finally, there is 
a real risk that this effort at greater taxpayer relief will have a negative impact upon Maine's goal 
of student equity.  
Problems measuring income  
The newspaper is filled with data on average income for this or that area. The average citizen 
might think that income is easy to measure. Unfortunately, that is simply not the case.  
There are now only two consistent sources of income data at the town level: Census data and 
income in jobs covered by unemployment. The Census data is collected every ten years. While 
income often changes slowly, areas with rapid growth (like southern Maine in the 1980s) or 
areas that lose major employers (like Limestone in the 1990s) will not be adequately represented 
by Census data.  
"Covered employment" refers to jobs that are covered by unemployment insurance. Self-
employed individuals and those who work "under-the-table" are excluded. In rural areas, this 
undercounting can be very significant. For example, Washington County is often in the top two 
or three counties for average wages in covered employment! This is because a very large share of 
the covered employment in Washington County is in the paper mill in Woodland. All the self-
employed fishers, clam diggers, and wood cutters are left out of covered employment. Moreover, 
covered employment earnings leave out income from sources other than employment, such as 
pensions and dividends.  
Presumably, Maine's income tax data could be used to construct average income data. Like 
covered employment data, income tax data leaves out "under-the-table" income, which can be 
significant in some communities. It also leaves out some important sources of unearned income, 
such as Social Security payments.  
All measures of local income are based upon the income of residents. However, property is also 
owned by non-residents, including some wealthy non-residents. Valuations may indeed by very 
high for shore-front property, but that property may largely be owned by financially-secure non-
residents. There is simply no way that Maine will force these non-residents to reveal accurately 
their income.  
An important statistical question is whether to use per capita income or family income as the 
measure of income. (Recognizing this problem, the tax code makes adjustments in deductions 
and exemptions among different family structures.) In urban areas with apartment complexes, 
many "families" will be one person or two unrelated individuals. In rural areas, "families" are 
likely to be larger, simply because of the type of housing that is available. In general, we would 
expect "family" income to be relatively higher in rural areas with larger families, and per capita 
income to be relatively higher in urban areas where there are more single, employed individuals. 
Any effort to define "average income" must confront this difficult definitional issue.  
When measuring income, there is the very important question of how to measure government 
transfer payments and subsidies. For example, housing subsidies can be a very large part of 
income. Moreover, these housing subsidies are generally stated to cap the percent of income paid 
for housing. An individual who lives in such subsidized housing is completely insulated from all 
changes in rent, including those due to property taxes. As subsidized housing is more frequently 
located in urban areas, the average or median income of urban areas may be made lower by the 
presence of a relatively large number of individuals who are insulated from the property tax.  
The traditional measures of income also do not measure "unaccrued" income. Consider, for 
example, a stock that is purchased at $100 in 1993 and which increases to $120 in 1994. If that 
stock is not sold, it has unaccrued earnings of $20. This income will not be included in measured 
income until the stock is sold. Obviously, a large source of unaccrued income is the increase in 
land values. Thus, someone who decides to invest in long-term assets, like land and stocks, 
increases her or his wealth but without necessarily increasing current income.  
I would not argue that these problems are completely insurmountable. By careful use of multiple 
data sources and by matching the data to the task at hand, meaningful income comparisons can 
almost certainly be constructed. But the task is clearly not as simple as turning to the Census 
tables for median income data. Very careful analysis of the technical questions is essential if a 
meaningful income adjustment is to be developed.  
 
Wealth is related to income  
The conventional wisdom has long been that the property tax is a very regressive and inequitable 
tax. The usual argument was that real estate wealth was not necessarily related to income. My 
profession, economics, was largely responsible for that conventional wisdom. Unfortunately, it 
has gone largely unnoticed in the political sector that economists have re-examined the evidence 
and found that the property tax is much less regressive than studies originally indicated. The 
property tax does impose a special burden on individuals on fixed incomes who own residential 
property, and especially on the elderly. This is a serious problem, and one that drives much of the 
concern about excessive reliance upon property taxes. However, it may be better to address that 
inequity directly, rather than to change the overall administration of the tax.  
Because individuals with more income tend to own more expensive homes, the property tax does 
have some relation to income. Consider two taxpayers who each face a 10 mil property tax. 
Someone in southern Maine who earns $60,000 and owns a $150,000 home will pay $1500 in 
property tax, or 2.5 percent of income. Someone in rural Maine who earns $25,000 and owns a 
$50,000 house will pay $500 in taxes, or 2 percent of income. This particular comparison would 
yield a conclusion that the property tax could be progressive. Obviously, other examples could 
be constructed, and the property tax undoubtedly has both regressive and progressive effects on 
various taxpayers. But if, as seems likely, house value is roughly proportional to income for most 
Maine middle-class families, then the property tax is probably a roughly proportional tax for the 
middle class.  
But the effect of the tax also depends upon who directly or indirectly owns commercial and 
industrial property. The stockholders in companies that own commercial and industrial property 
are overwhelming wealthy individuals. The wealthiest five percent of households own over 
ninety percent of the stock and a very similar share of other property. Consequently, the property 
tax on commercial and industrial property is basically a tax on the wealthy.  
The property tax in fact taxes one form of income that income taxes do not: Unaccrued earnings 
from real estate. Income that otherwise might go untaxed for several decades is partially taxed by 
the property tax system, because assessed value should reflect increases in market value. While 
this may be bad news for those who invest in real estate because they want to avoid income 
taxes, this is good news from the broader view of tax equity. Again, because most of this 
unaccrued income is earned by wealthier individuals, this effect of the property tax tends to be 
progressive.  
If the real goal is to tax only on the basis of income, then the solution is to fund all education 
from the state income tax. Some critics of the property tax, including some of my fellow 
economists, have proposed just that. But more economists are coming to the conclusion that 
several small taxes are better than a single large tax. When any single tax rate gets large, people 
spend more and more to avoid taxes. This tax avoidance reduces the income from the tax, and it 
also wastes society's resources on accountants and lawyers. A number of small taxes are both 
harder to avoid and also less worth spending effort to avoid.  
The one, undisputed regressive feature of the property tax is the effect on retired individuals who 
still own a home. But a state can address this problem very directly, through a circuit-breaker 
and/or a homestead tax credit (see below). In fact, a property tax with a generous homestead tax 
credit and a well-designed circuit-breaker would probably be a progressive tax.  
Treatment of non-residential property and second homes  
Some of the discussion about adding income to the education funding formula has been a bit 
superficial. It tends to assume that the only property being taxed is primary residences. In fact, 
industrial, commercial, recreational, and seasonal properties are an important part of the property 
tax base. If the formula is amended so that towns with lower income receive larger school 
subsidies, then the tax break goes not only to poor home-owners, but also to businesses and to 
non-resident property owners in those towns.  
Consider the extreme case of a town with $18 million in commercial property and $2 million in 
residential property. Assume that it has a mil rate of 10 mils, so $180,000 is raised from 
commercial property and $20,000 from residential property. Assume that we wanted to provide a 
10 percent reduction in property taxes for residential property owners. To accomplish this 10 
percent reduction, the funding formula would have to provide an additional $20,000 to that town, 
an amount equal to the entire amount of taxes paid by residential property owners!  
It might seem reasonable to treat different classes of property differently, so that the taxes levied 
on businesses and on recreational and seasonal properties would not be affected by the state 
subsidy. However, this option is essentially not available because of constitutional provisions 
against discrimination in the administration of taxes. That is why residential property tax relief is 
a state, rather than a local, function.  
Tax burden versus average income  
The reason for adding income to the school funding formula is to reduce the burden of the 
property taxes on homeowners. But to measure the burden of the tax on homeowners, we need to 
look at the ratio of property taxes to income, rather than simply average or median income. A 
town might have relatively low incomes, but also have very low property taxes. This almost 
certainly occurs, for example, in some rural towns with very large commercial or industrial 
facilities. On the other hand, in a town with little commercial or industrial property, relatively 
affluent families might have very high tax bills even in relation to their income.  
At the very least, we ought to look at the distribution of tax burdens before and after any 
proposed income adjustment is added to the school funding formula. We certainly do not want to 
cause greater disparity in tax burdens in the name of equalizing the burden.  
Alternate property tax relief  
The property tax has an inequitable effect upon retired individuals who still own residential 
property. One of the major forces for property tax relief has been, and continues to be, this issue. 
But this particular inequity can be directly addressed by a circuit-breaker mechanism. Under a 
circuit-breaker mechanism, a rebate is provided for property tax payments that exceed some 
percent of income (such as 5 percent). The circuit-breaker could be available to all taxpayers or 
only to taxpayers over some age.  
The political problem with a circuit-breaker is that the relief goes to local taxpayer, while the 
cost of the program is borne by the state. Consequently, Maine's efforts at circuit-breakers have 
consistently been underfunded. They are simply not a priority in the state budget. Yet, a circuit-
breaker is clearly the most effective way to eliminate the regressive effects of the property tax.  
Another option for elderly homeowners is a "reverse mortgage" arrangement. Instead of 
requiring payment of the property tax, the town accepts a mortgage against the property for the 
amount of the tax due. Essentially, the town loans the taxpayer the amount of unpaid taxes and 
that loan is secured by a mortgage. There is no risk of foreclosure or eviction; the mortgage 
cannot be called as long as the individual remains in the home, regardless of how large the 
mortgage grows. When the home is sold, the town receives both the principal and any accrued 
interest on the loan that was provided to pay property taxes.  
A number of states have a "homestead tax credit." Under a homestead tax credit, each family that 
resides in the state receives a payment that offsets the property tax payment on some part of the 
value of a home. Usually, the homestead tax credit is administered as part of the state income 
tax. A homestead tax credit is often a fixed payment (for example $500) that is designed to offset 
the first $500 of property tax payments. Many homestead tax credits also permit renters to 
receive benefits. A homestead tax credit could be designed so that the local property tax on the 
first $30,000 (for example) of assessed value is rebated. The effect of a homestead tax credit is 
generally to shift the burden of the property tax so that primary residences are less heavily taxed 
than industrial, commercial, or recreational property.  
Some states also have preferential treatment for farmland that, like the homestead tax credit, has 
the effect of reducing the effective property tax on producing farms. Generally, such programs 
restrict the ability of the farmland to be developed after it has qualified for preferential property 
taxes.  
It is absolutely clear that direct tax relief through a circuit-breaker and/or a homestead tax credit 
is the only way to generate significant improvements in the equity of the property tax. Every 
dollar reduction in property taxes due to a circuit-breaker is targeted at the specific problem. 
Under a funding formula change, only a small proportion of the tax reductions in any given town 
ends up in the hands of low income individuals.  
Cost-of-education indices 
The Rosser Commission proposed a rather crude effort to adjust the school subsidy formula for 
differences in the cost of running schools. (At least one member of the Commission has since 
publicly backed away from this aspect of the report.) Despite the real limitations of the Rosser 
Commission approach, it may be that differences in the costs of running schools across the state 
should be reflected in the funding formula.  
But it is not obvious that costs are lower in northern Maine than in southern Maine. Rural 
northern Maine faces higher transportation costs and higher energy costs. Smaller school districts 
have some problems achieving lower costs because schools are smaller and fixed costs are a 
larger share of the budget. Labor costs, such as electricians and custodians, are probably lower in 
northern Maine. But differences in teacher compensation, the largest component in costs, may 
reflect the financial ability of wealthier towns to bid better teachers away from poorer districts or 
a tendency by larger districts to hire more specialized professionals for special education and 
similar functions.  
The real question is two-fold: First, are there large enough differences in the cost of running 
schools to justify the annual expense of creating a meaningful school cost index? Second, if there 
are significant differences, how do we measure them? To answer these questions requires not 
arm-chair theorizing, but rather a rigorous study by economists who understand the construction 
and interpretation of cost indices. If the Legislature wants the answer, then it should authorize a 
detailed study of cost differences and then return to this issue in the next session armed with firm 
facts. I suspect that such a study would find some small differences in costs, probably with lower 
costs away from southern Maine. But I also suspect that such a study would identify variations 
among districts in special education and similar costs at least as important in explaining 
differences as labor or material rates. Again, simplistic use of some aggregated government price 
index will not adequately measure the real forces driving cost differences.  
Keeping student equity  
Any reform of Maine's school funding formula must be consistent with the central goals of the 
state education assistance. Maine passed its path-breaking 1985 School Finance Act in order to 
guarantee that every Maine student would have access to an adequate education. As a result of 
that legislation, the disparities in spending between Maine's poorest districts and Maine's richest 
districts fell to among the lowest in the country. Except for a few very high-cost islands, most 
districts spend between $3500 and $7000 per pupil. Because of this law, Maine does not have 
districts with classroom sizes of 35 or 40. Virtually all Maine high schools now offer a 
curriculum that is at least minimally adequate. The strong performance of Maine students on 
national tests reflects this commitment. Despite some of the rhetoric to the contrary, Maine can 
be proud of its efforts to educate all of its students. By any measure of pupil equity, the 1985 
School Finance Act has been extremely successful.  
I would not argue that the current funding statute is either perfect or sacred. The statute can be 
improved; adjustments to improve taxpayer equity can almost certainly be crafted. But 
improvements will be found in careful analysis and not in overly simplistic solutions. The quest 
for simple solutions in the current environment of universal anxiety over tight school budgets is 
quite understandable. But we cannot permit this anxiety to drive changes that reverse the 
fundamental commitment to pupil equity in the School Finance Act. A poorly designed income 
adjustment factor could have the perverse effect of increasing the disparities in spending between 
the lowest-spending and highest-spending districts in the state. A funding mechanism that tries to 
achieve greater taxpayer equity at the cost of substantially greater student inequity would be a 
very poor bargain for Maine in the long run. 
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